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Recently economists have been paying increased attention to the dif­
ferences in the human capital invested in men and women in order to accol.lllt 
for some part of the male-female earnings differential. 1 At the same time, 
economists primarily interested in the determinants of population change 
have developed models which demonstrate that family size is only one dimen­
sion of household child investment, that the parent'al decisions concerning 
the desired quantity of children are closely related to decisions concerning 
2the level of resources devoted to each prospective child, or child quality. 
Empirical analysis in this area, however, has been for the most part confined 
to testing the fertility implications of these models 3 and no attention has 
been paid to the possibility that the family resources invested in children 
may differ along sex lines. Conlisk (1969) has shown that the variation in 
one proxy for the quality investment in children, school enrollment, is domi­
nated by changes in family variables. That the urban enrollment rates of 
male and female teen-agers have been significantly different, as displayed 
in Table I for recent decades, may thus be evidence of such household-level 
sex-specific differential child investment, though not necessarily of intra­
family "discrimination." To the extent that these early differentials are 
important, an analysis of the determinants of sex-specific household invest­
ment may provide some further understanding of the observed sex-differentials 
in the earnings of adults. 
In this study, it is shown that not only the recent decline in birth 
rates, but the differential levels of and changes in male and female teen-age 
4school rates, and the rise in per-pupil schooling expenditures are mainly 
-2-
the joint products of changes in parameters pertaining to the child in­
vestment decisions of parents, particularly women in the home. In part I, 
a household production model of the family's child investment behavior 
which explicitly considers the possibility of the differential allocation 
of resources to male and female children is outlined and the differential 
influences of the educational attainment and time values of the husband 
and the wife on the quality and quantity of children and on the derived 
demand for the goods used in the production of these commodities are analy~ed. 
In part II, the implications derived from the framework described in part I 
are tested empirically with aggregate state data from the 1960 Census of 
Population: proxies for household production variables are related to the 
average completed family size, the male and female teen-age school enroll­
ment rates, and the public school expenditures of residents of urban areas. 
I. The Theoretical Framework 
a. The Production of Child Services 
The fundamental insight of the household production analysis in its 
general form is that the ultimate objects of consumer satisfaction, called 
"commodities," are produced in the hane with goods purchased in the market 
and the time of the family members. In order to 
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. h h ld in thjhighlight the sex-specific child investment decisions of the ouse o , 
analysis the set of commodities is aggregated into four-- the 
quantity of children N, the quality per child of female children,QF , 
the quality per child of male children, QM,and S, a composite of 
all other commodities produced in the home which are alternative 
sources of satisfaction for the family. It is assumed that the 
two parents desire to maximize their lifetime utility with respect 
to these commodities and thus the stochastic and sequential nature 
of child investment is not considered. 
5 
If f is the proportion of total children who are female, then 
I I 
the total amount of female child services produced in the household 
is fN~F; total male child services is similarly (1-f) NQM. 
The production of these child services and Sare described by the 
household production functions (1), (2), and (3) 
(1) 
(3) 
where the production inputs in each commodityiare the time of the 
husband and wife, THi, TWi, and purchased goods Xi; the E. are vectors 
1 
of "environmental" variables, which influence the productivity of 
the inputs but have no direct effect on the amount of commodities 
produced. Two of these"E" variables, the education of e·ach parent 
are discussed below. 
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Dividing functions (1) and (2) by the quantities of female and 
male children respectively yields (4) and (5), the relation between 
average inputs of parental time, tWi'tHi' and goods,x 1 , and the a
mounts 
of quality per male and female child:
5 
(4) 
Q = g/XM TWM THM ~
M -l(l-f)N, (1-f) N , (1-f)N, 
1M = g( xM , tWM , tHM , 
1M) (5) 
Quality per child can thus be represented by the total resources devoted to, 
or the resource intensity of, each child, which is assumed to be subject to 
the choice of the parents. Note that the amounts of inputs per unit of 
quality per child may differ between male and female children if the technical 
properties of the production functions differ, i.e., if raising ma·le and female 
children to the same level of quality efficiently requires different 
combinations and amounts of inputs. .The ''.price" of an additional 
unit of child services, male or female, is the cost of producing that 
additional unit, i.e., marginal cost. This cost is equal to the sum 
of the costs of the additional production inputs required, which is 
in turn related to the amounts and prices of those inputs. Under 
the assumption of the linear homogenity of the production functions, 
every unit of quality per child requires the same amounts of time 
and goods (for efficient production), thus the marginal (=average) 
quantities of inputs are tWi' tHi' and xi. If Pw, pH, and pxi are the 
prices of the wife's time, the husband's time, and the price index 
of the composite good used in the production of commodity i, then 




As can be seen, if the production technologies of male and female 
child services are dissimilar, their shadow prices will also differ. 
' Similarly, the commodity, S, which is also 
produced in the household, has its own shadow price: 
(8) 
Since both the quantity of children, N, and the per-child 
sex-specific quality commodities, QF and QM, enter the utility function 
of the family separately (are rmique sources of satisfaction), their 
shadow prices must be distinguished in order to describe the consump­
tion behavior of the parents. The shadow price of quality per 
female child is the increase in the total expenditures on child ser­
vices necessitated by a unit increase in the production of QF holding 
constant the number of female children. Since total expenditures 
on child services is Nf QF~F + N(l-f) QM~M , the shadow price of QF 
is therefore equal to Nf~F' the fixed number of female children times 
the shadow price of female child services. Thus the larger the 
number of female children, fN, the more "expensive" is female 
quality per child since the additional unit of quality must be 
allocated to every female child. Similarly, the shadow price of 
QM, quality per male child,is (1-f)N•M and is a positive function of 
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the quantity of male children. 
The shadow price of the total quality of children, N, the 
increase in total expenditures on child services induced by a unit 
increase in the number of children, for given levels of quality per 
child, is f'QF,rF +. (1-f) QM 11'M ; the Jti.gher the amounts of child 
quality chosen, the more costly are increases in family size. 
The family family maximizes its utility function (9) subject to 
constraints on the lifetime resources of goods and time: the 
total amount of market goods purchased cannot exceed the lifetime 
earnings of the 
(9) 
two parents and the amount of time each parent spends in household 
production and in the labor market, LW and LH,must not be greater 
then the total time available to each~Tw and TH. If it is assmned 
that both the husband and the wife spend some part of their life-
time in the labor force for the purpose of earning income, 7 at life­
time wage rates WH and WW, then the lifetime expenditure eonstraint is: 
(10) 




The time and expenditure constraints (10), (11), and (12) can be 
combined into one "full income"constraint, (13), by noting that goods 
can be traded for time in the labor market at the market wage 
rates and that the prices of time of the husband and wife_, PW and PH, 
are equal to their market wages , wH and wF. 8 
(13) 
Necessary conditions for achieving maximum satisfaction from 
the consumption of the four commodities subject to the full income 
constraintfa.re that the ratio of the marginal utilities 
of each pair of commodities equal the ratio of their shadow prices, 
as defined above; i.e.: 
UQ fNnF UQ (1-f) NnMF = (15)(14) M = 
us us 'It's'It's 
UN= fQF,rF + (1-f) QM'll'M (16) u
N = fQP 'll'F + (1-f) QM 'II' 
us ns M (17)UQ fNnFF 
UN fQFnF + (1-f) QM 1TM (18) UQ f1rF 
us - (l-f)N1rM F = (19)
UQ (1-f) 'll'M 
M 
Before analyzing in more detail the roles of the husband and 
wife in the optimal production of the commodities, a number of 
implications for child quality investment and fertility can be 
drawn from these first-order conditions. First,from expressions 
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(17) and (18), it can be seen that any phenomenon which reduces 
fertility (N) will also diminish the shadow prices of child quality. 
If the. use of more efficient birth control techniques lowers actual 
fertility, for given levels of desired family size, then the 
greater the efficiencywith which contraception is utilized the 
higher will be the levels of quality per child. If the educational 
attainment of the wife is positively associated with contraceptive ef­
ficiency 9 then her schooling should be both negatively correlated 
with fertility and positively correlated with child quality. The 
human capital embodied in the parents, however, may have other 
influences on child investment, through home productivity and 
"taste" effects, and these are discussed below. 
A second inference that can be drawn from conditions (14)through 
(19)pertains to the differential investment in children of different 
sex. Ratio (19} shows that the shadow price of 
QM relative to QF depends on the relative amounts of male and female 
children; thus, for instance, families with a greater proportion 
of female children will desire a higher level of male than female 
child quality. Since in the aggregate population f -.:=::. 5, it would 
s.eenr that only differential preferences for QF and QM, or technolog­
ical differences, could result in different levels of male and 
female quality in the total population. However, evidence exists 
that , at least in some societies families whose first offspring are 
female bear more total children than families whose first child is male. 
10 
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This "son-biased" behavior would produce a negative correlation 
between N, total fertility, and (1-f), the proportion of children 
who are male in these societies and would result in 1) a lower 
average quality per child, since the shadow prices of both QF 
and QM would be higher in these societies due to the higher 
number of children, and 2) a greater level of quality per male 
child than per female child, since f would probably exceed 1-f 
and thus the average shadow price of QF would be greater than 
that of QM 11 ,~ Preference for quantity of males thus also results 
in higher investment in male children even if tastes for QF and 
QM are not dissimilar. 
A third implication of these shadow price relationships is 
that compulsory education laws, to the extent that they are effective, 
that is, that they actually induce a rise in. quality per child 
beyond the level deemed optimal by the parents, should have a negative 
effect on fertility since the shadow price of quantity would be 
increased with the legislated increases in QF and QM. Such 
schooling legislation thus makes children more "expensive". 
Moreover, these laws may have a differential impact on male and 
female quality levels due, perhaps, to differential enforcement 
according to sex. This phenomenon, the existence of which is 
tested in Part II, would be an example of societal and not familial bias. 
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A final implication derived from the dependence of the shadow 
price of child quantity on the desired level of child quality is 
that "pure" income increases will raise the shadow price of 
quantity if preferences are biased towards child quality, that is, 
if the pure income elasticity of child quality exceeds that of quantity: 
Thus even if nF and nM remain constant, a rise in income could 
lead to increases in the quality investment in children and a 
decline in fertility if the negative shadow price effect was st~onger 
than the pres\lllled positive pure income effect with respect to the 
total quantity of children. 12 
Changes in nF, nM' TI 8 , for constant levels of real income,
13 
however, may have stronger effects on the decisions concerning the 
production of male and female child quality and n\llllbers of children. 
While such prices are not directly observable, the prices of their 
components , parental time and goods, can be measured. In the next 
section the relationships between the wages and schooling levels 
of the husband and wife and the demand for n\llllbers of children, 
sex-specific child qualitY., and the mixture of imputs used in the 
production of these commodities are analyzed. 
b. Child Investment and the Parents 
Changes in the price of time (wage rates) of the husband and 
wife will result in shifts in the proportions of commodities con­
sumed if such changes alter the child services prlces, nf and TIM' 
andthe price of S,n • An increase in the wage rate of either parent8 
would raise all three prices, since parental time is assumed to be 
-11:... 
used in the production of every commodity, but the ratio of the 
prices would remain unchanged only if the value shares of parents' 
14time in every~- were equal. The effect of variations in paren-
1 
tal wage rates on the consumption mix will thus depend on the 
relative earnings shares, or time-value intensities, of each 
parent in the three ~'s and on the effects of changes on the ~'s 
on the consumption of each commodity. Moreover, because the rela­
tive time intensities of the husband and wife may differ, the 
effects of changes in their respective wages may also be dissimilar. 
Making some plausible assumptions about the effects of changes in 
the commodity shadow prices and about the ranking of parental time 
intensities among the commodities yields a number of empirically 
testable hypothesis concerning the magnitude and dmrection of the 
,influence of changes in the wife's price of time relative to that 
of the husband on the investment in children-- on the relative 
amounts of child quantity and child quality per male and female 
child produced by the family. 
The (compensated) effect of a change in the w~fe's wage on N, 
'the total mumber of children desired, expressed in elasticity terms,is 
(20) 
where aFW'aMW are the wife's earnings shares in the shadow price of 
male and female child services, a Wis the wife's earnings share in5 
n5 , and E 
15 are the elasticities of total child quantity with
N, ni 
respect to changes in nF and nM. If it can be assumed that increases 
in the shadow prices of male and female child services decrease the 
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16demand for the quantity of children, i.e. EN 'If ,. EN < O, then 
, ,rM' F 
expression 2Q ) will be negative if both male and female child 
services are more time-value intensive (with respect to the wife's 
fime) than S. 
The assumption that child services production is intensive in 
the wife's time is not only intuitively appealing but is consistent 
with the evidence of a negative effect of the presence of children 
in the home on the labor force participation of married women found 
by Mincer (1962~, Cain (1966), Bowen and Finegan (1969), and Smith 
(1972)-- women who choosemore children spend more time in house­
hold production. Thus it would be expected that increases in the 
wife's wage would reduce desired levels of family size. 
The relation between changes in the husband's wage and N is 
of similar form to expression ( 20 )except that the a' s refer to the 
value intensities of the husband's time in the shadow prices of 
child services and S. It can be seen that if the husband distributes 
his time equally in the production of the household commodities, 
aFH ~ aMH ~a.SH , or if his participation in household production 
is not great, then changes in his price of time will have a neg­
ligible influence on fertility. Evidence that the husband spends 
more time in the production of non-child commodities (S) than in 
child investment, means that an increase in the husband's wage 
may even have a small Positive effect on family size. 17 
The assumption of greater differences in the wife's time-value 
intensities between commodities (specialization in child investment) 
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and of her greater participation. in household production in general, 
compared to the husband's allocation of timeJmeans that it is 
variations in the wife's price of time which will also dominate 
changes in the levels of quality per male and female child. Ex­
pressions ( 21 and (22 ), derived from the model, display the effects 
of changes in the wife's wage, in elasticity terms, on the demand 
for female, ( 2i) and male (22'), quality per child: 
(21) 
(22) 
El'L, and EQ. , are cross elasticities, expressing the effect of 
'<F,'1111 ;/\-. 
a change in the parent's demand for the level of male (female) 
quality with respect to a change in the shadow price of female 
(male) child services, and are positive if it is assumed that 
male and female child quality are substitutes in consumption. Thus, 
if increases in the shadow price_of male and female child services 
decrease quality per child as well as the quantity of children 
(E0 .n. , E < Q ) and the substitutibility between male an
d female 
·"M' .M q.,n F 
qualxty levels is not large, the wife's wage would be negatively 
correlated with the quality of children, ceteris paribus. 
Expressions (21) and (22) also show that differences in the re­
sponse of quality levels per child to variations in the wife's wage, 
for male and female children, i.e., differential investment in 
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children according to sex, could be due to any combination of 
two factors: 1) preferencesfor Qr and QM differ, that is 
aMW = arw but EQf;r # E(m-~M and 2) the time value intensities 
•, of male and female child services are dissimilar, E(L, = EQ. 
"'t,-rrf l'\'7f.11 
but aMW 1 arw· The latter would be true if the household production 
technologies of Qr and QM were not identical, presumably because 
of innate differences between the sexes; the former corresponds 
more closely to the notion of "discrimination", but at the house­
hold level. 
The greater influence of changes in the wife's price of time 
CO!lpared to that of the husband on child investment also applies 
to the relative effects of parental human capital. Education, 
as an environmental production variable, may influence the shadow 
price of the commodities if it alters the marginal productivity 
of time in household production. If education raised the pro­
ductivity of time equally in the production of every commodity 18 
then the co?Te1ations between educational attainment and child 
quality and quantity would be opposite to those characterizing the 
wage rate-child investment relationships; high levels of the wife's 
sbhooling would be associated with high levels of fertility and 
child quality. The prediction of a positive association between 
fertility and the wife's educational attainment based on the 
household production efficiency hypothesis, however, is opposite to 
that arising from the notion that contraceptive efficiency and 
the wife's schooling are positively correlated, as discussed in 
-15-
the preceeding section. If schooling were not also correlated 
with "tastes", the estimated sign of the female schooling coefficient in 
a fertility regression also containing wage rates would indicate 
which education effect is dominant. The level of the husband's 
schooling, if household production efficiency were the only influence 
on education, would have little effect on child investment given 
the small amount and even distribution of his time devoted to 
household production. 
Changes in the value of the wife's price of time and her 
educational attainment will also influence the allocation of the 
production jzi.puts used in child investment. An increase in t.he 
wife's wage, for instance, would induce her to substitute market 
goods for her more expensive time per unit of child services 
produced. This positive relation between the wife's wage and the 
per-unit goods input used in the production of male and female 
child services would be stronger the more time-value intensive 
9 are child services· 1 and the greater the ease with which goods 
and time can be substituted in household production. The response 
of the~ amount of child quality goods input demanded due to 
changes in the female wage will, however, als~ depend on the change in the 
level, or number of units, of child services produced, the sub-
stitution effect in consumption .• · Given the assumption of the time-
value intensity of child services, the latter effect will be negative 
and may:· ·thus wholly or partly offset the positive production sub-
stitution effect. The net influence of a change in female wage 
-16-
rates on the derived demand for expenditures on child quality will 
thus depend on the magnitude of the consumption and production 
elasticities. Increases in the wage rates of women could result 
in both increased expenditures per child and a decline in the demand 
for child quality. 
The education of the wife, to the extent that formal schooling 
increases the productivity of her time in home production, would 
be negatively correlated with the per-unit amo\ll'l.t of goods used in the 
production of child services -- more productive time would be 
substituted for goods. Since the household productivity effect 
of education also results in a positive association between the 
level of time-intensive child quality and schooling, the net effect 
of the educational attainment of women on the derived demand for 
total child expenditures is also ambiguous. Higher levels of schooling 
of women could thus be associated with higher quality children 
but less expenditures per child. 
C. pummary 
Before proceeding to the next section, in which measures of 
fertility, male and female child quality, and expenditures on children 
are regressed on proxies for the household production variables 
implicated in the prece ding· analysis , it may be useful to review 
some of the empirical "predictions" derived from the theoretical 
framework: 
1) Female should dominate male variables in all the regression 
-17-
equations, that is the educational attainment and wage variables 
pertaining to the wife should exert more influence on the three 
measures of child investment than do those pertaining to the husband. 
2) The partial correlations between the female wage rate 
and fertility and male and female ·quality are most likely to be 
negative if women specialize in child investment-; the wage effects 
on the sex-specific quality measures may differ if either preferences 
ftastes, for male and female child quality differ or their production 
characteristics ("technologies") are dissimilar. 
3) The influence of female education on fertility depends 
on the relative strengths of the contraceptive knowledge and home 
productivity effects of schooling. If the schooling of the wife 
and the knowledge of efficient birth control techniques are posi­
tively associated, then female education will have a negative 
impact on the birth rate and a positive effect on quality per 
child. If schooling increases the productivity of the wife's time 
in home production, then female educational attainment should be 
positively correlated with both·fertility and child quality. If 
both education effects are operative, the female schooling 
coefficient ,ln the fertility regression equation should be al­
gerbraically less then its counterpart in the child quality regressions. 
4) The relation between the wife's wage and the derived demand 
for total expenditures per child may be positive even if the demand 
for quality per child declines with increases in the wife's price 
-18-
of time, if there is strong substitution of goods for time in the 
household production of child services. 
5) Compulsory schooling laws, if they succeed in riasing child 
quality above the levels otherwise desired by parents, should have 
a negative influence on family size and may also be an institutional, 
or non-household, source of bias with respect to sex-specific child 
investment if they are enforced in a discriminatory manner. 
II. Empirical Analysis 
a) The Data and the Dependent Variables 
The preceding framework implied that family size, male and female 
child quality intensity, and the aggregated goods used as inputs in 
child quality production are all dimensions of child investment 
jointly related to the variables pertaining to the parental decision-
20 
makers. Thus, to test the implications of the model, empirical counter-
parts to these theoretical constructs are used in four separate ordinary 
least squares regression equations corresponding to the four child in­
vestment measures. An important advantage of considering a number of 
aspects of child investment simultaneously is that another dimension is 
added to the test of the model -- the consistency of the signs of the 
variable coefficients across equations. 21 
The unit of observation used in all equations is the state and all 
data pertain to urban residents 22 as defined in the 1960 Census of 
Population. While the household production model of child investment 
has been formulated in terms of an individual family, the model is 
tested on aggregate data because aggregate samples have two important 
. 23advantages over data consisting of individual observations .. 
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1) The price of time of women in individual families is often unknown 
and endogenously related to the proxies for child investment because 
many women, at a given point in time, are not in the labor market; 
the existence of separate labor markets in urban areas between 
states provides estimates of female wage rates and thus the average 
opportunity cost of time for women in each state. 2) Variation 
in tastes, high among individual families, is considerably attenuated 
when aggregate population averages are utilized. This phenomenon 
is important because among individual families, preferences for 
child services influence labor force participation and thus the 
relevant opportunity costs of child investment. 24 
Of the four dependendent variables representing different aspects 
of child investment, that used in the fertility regression is the 
number of children ever born per 1,000 urban married women aged 
35-44 (CEB). This age-cohort was chosen because these women are 
likely to have completed their childbearing and thus the fertility 
measure corresponds closely to the lifetime child quantity variable 
in the model. Measures of the completed fertility of older cohorts 
were not used because the effects of mortality on these surviving 
women might produce biases in the estimated regression coefficients. 
-20-
The sex-specific child quality variables, QM and QF , are 
measured by the school enrollment rates of male and female urban 
25teen-agers aged 15-18 (ENRM, ENRF) The theory of human capital 
investment 26 suggests that those parents who desire high quality 
children will invest more in them at every stage of the child's 
life cycle, at home and in school; thus children's schooling and 
the household investment in children should be positively correlated. 
To· the extent that schooling and time-intensive household child 
investment are substitutes, however, the coefficients of the wife's 
wage variables will be biased upwards. 
Aggregate current state public school expenditures per pupil 
in average daily attendance in urban districts (EXP) is the proxy 
used to represent the goods input in the production of child quality.27 
It is assumed that families are able to influence the level of these 
-21-
expenditures on education through either the political process 
or migration. The omission of private school expenditures from 
this educational expenditure measure may bias towards zero all 
the estimated coefficients of the variables in the expenditure 
regression equations if public school expenditures understate 
total expenditures on schooling more for high then for low ex­
penditure-demand states. 
b. Independent Variables 
The measure of the opportunity cost of time for women aged 
35-44 used in all the regressions (FW) is the average wage of 
all women in that age group who worked-- their annual income divided 
by an estimate of the number of weeks worked during the year. 
This computed wage is preferable to annual female earnings because 
time spent in the labor force and thus total female income will 
be negatively correlated with child investment,since such activity 
is time intensive. Thus a negative correlation between female 
earnings and child investment variables would not represent the 
effect of the wife's price of time on fertility or child quality 
but the influence of tastes for children on earnings. The wage 
coefficient may, however, be biased downward because women with 
higher preferences for child services would tent to have less labor 
force experience, and thus less human capital, for given levels of 
schooling, then other women. The "depreciation" of the market 
28 
sk 1·11sof t hese women h • • • • • ·w 1le spec1al1z1ng in home production could 
-22-
also produce a negative co,;,relation between female wage rates and 
measures of child investment even in the absence of the substi­
tution effects predicted by the household production model. To 
the extent that aggregation reduces the variety in taste~, however, 
this latter consideration is unimportant-- taste dispersion between 
states is much less strong than between individuals. 
The male price of time (MW) is constructed in the same manner 
as the female variable. The parental education measures (EDF, EDM) 
are the number of years of schooling completed by males and females 
aged 35-44. These wage and schooling variables represent the basic 
household production parameters whiGh are used in each equation. 
Infant mortality (IM) is also entered in all the regressions 
to capture the effect of child survival probability on number of 
births and on child quality. While the sign of the coefficient of 
this variable in the fertility equation is ambiguous-- decreases 
in infant mortality both increase the demand for surviving children 
(if infant deaths are costly) and decrease the number of births 
needed to attain any given family size, increases in the likelihood 
that children will survive and become adults should raise the amount 
of resources invested in them. 
To assess the differential strength of compulsory schooling laws on 
sex-specific teen-age school enrollment or child quality; and thus on family 
size, the minimum lawful school-leaving age for each state (EDLAW) is entered 
in all regressions. Edwards (1970) found that these laws had 
differential effects on teen-age male and female school enrollment 
-23-
rates, being more effective in boosting the rates of teen-age 
males. 
The proportion of urban non-whites aged 35-44 (NONW) is 
included to test if, ceteris paribus, whites and non-whites differ 
with respect to their child investment behavior. Conlisk (1969) 
found that non-whites have significantly lower enrollment rates 
than whites and McMahon (1970), Gustman and Pidot (1973) and 
DeTray (1973) concluded that non-whites also spend less per child 
for educational purposes; all these results, however, were obtained 
from equations whose specifications differ from those used here. 
In addition to these variables, which are included in all 
four regression equations, the urban unemployment rate for the 
age groups 15-24 (U) and the wage rate of the non-agricultural 
unskilled (OPW) were entered in the enrollment equations to control 
for the opportunity costs of schooling. It would be expected that, 
for given desired levels of child quality, enrollment rates of 
teen-agers would be higher in those states where teen-age unemploy­
ment was high, since the probability of getting work in those 
states would be small, and where the relevant opportunity wages 
available were low. 
C. The Results 
Table IV reports on the results of the four child investment 
regressions; Tables II and III define the symbols and provide the 
sources of the variables used. 
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In general, the household production pararneters,together 
with the selected control variables, account for over 50% of the 
interstate variation in each of the four measures of chi~d in­
vestment and the signs and statistical significance of the co­
effecients are consistent with the implications derived from the 
formal model of part I. The most striking characteristic of the 
set of equations is the dominance of female over male variables. 
In all cases but one, the schooling and wage coefficients pertain­
ing to males are not significantly different from zero, while all 
of the coefficients of the household production parameters per­
taining to women at least approach statistical significance. 
Thus, the results confirm the notion that it is women who supply 
the most time to child investment in the home. 
a- Child Quantity- Fertility 
The significant negative effect of the female wage on family 
size is consistent with the assl.Dllption that child services require 
more of the wife's time per unit of output than other commodities 
produced in the household. High levels of the wife's education 
are also associated with lower fertility, a result which seems to 
support the hypothesis that female schooling and contraceptive 
efficiency are positively correlated. The recent decline in birth 
rates can thus be attributed to increases in both female educational 
attainment, which would shrink discrepencies between desired and 
actual fertility, and female wage rates, which would lead to a 
decline in the desired number of children, who require relatively 
large amounts of more expensive female time. 
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While.the wage of the husband has no effect on fertility, because 
of the small participation of the husband in household production 
and the relatively even distribution of his time among consumption 
activities in the household, male schooling levels are positively, 
but weakly, correlated with family size. Increases in the educa­
tional attainment of both males and females by 10% results in a 
net reduction in fertility of 7.5%; the negative female education 
effect dominates the positive influence of male schooling. 
The negative and significant coefficient for NONW seems to 
indicate that, for given levels of parental education and wage 
rates, urban non-whites bear less children than urban whites. 
The effect of the compulsory schooling laws on· family size, while in the 
predicted negative direction, is not significantly different from 
zero. The reason for the lack of influence of these laws on fertility 
may be their failure to raise school enrollment rates, and thus 
child quality, by significant amounts. 
b. Male and Female Child Quality- Sex-specific School Enrollment Rates 
Female wages are also negatively and significantly correlated 
with the child quality variables, indicating that rises in the 
wages of women will lower the demand for the quality of children 
because of the wife's time intensity of child investment. The 
observed upward trend in school enrollment rates, is due to the much 
stronger positive (approaching significance) influence of the school­
ing level of women. The relatively strong positive effect of female 
educational attainment (EDF) may be due to the negative impact 
of female schooling on the quantity of children, as was found in 
-26-
the CEB regression, which would raise desired levels of quality 
per child, the positive effect of schooling on the productivity 
of the wife's time on household production, which would lower the 
cost of time-intensive child investment more than other com'"" 
modities, and/or a positive correlation between schooling and 
tastes for high quality children. Because of the strength of 
the positive education effect, increases in schooling and earnings 
of women would, ori net, thus result in an increase in the demand 
for child quality. 
The rise in both male and female teen-age enrollment rates from 
1960 to 1970, depicted in Table I, can thus be explained by the 
influence of rises in the schooling of f,emale parents. The 
higher level of male and the greater increse in female school 
enrollment rates during this period can also be accounted for by 
the results obtained. Only two variables in the male and female 
quality equations have significantly different coefficients-- the 
female wage (FW) and the compulsory schooling law variable (EDLAW). 
C~teris paribus, compulsory schooling laws appear to affect only 
male teen-age school enrollment; the coefficient of this variable 
is positive and approaches significance in the male enrollment 
equation, but is not significantly different from zero in the female 
child quality regression. Thus the impact of compulsory schooling 
legislation may account somewhat for the higher level of the male 
school enrollment rate. 
-27-
That the negative influence of the wife's wage rate on female 
school enrollment is significantly less strong than its effect on 
male school enrollment is supportive of the hypothesis that male 
and female children are treated differently in the home. It will 
be recalled that the model formulated in part I predicts~ just such 
a result for the female wage under the assumption of the greater 
time intensity of-male than female child quality; the desired level 
of male child quality will increase less than that of female child 
quality because male children require more of the wife's time 
per unit of quality produced. Alternatively, of course, the pre­
dicted changes in the levels of male and female child quality may 
reflect a correlation between preferences for sex-specific levels 
of child quality and female earnings. 
The_ other coefficients obtained in the school enrollment 
equations indicate that whites and non-whites do not differ in their 
demand for child quality and that low levels of infant mortality 
are associated with high levels of quality investment in children. 
The latter result is consistent· with the hypothesis that parents 
are more willing to invest in children the higher the probability 
of their survival to adulthood. 
The positive effect of the unemployment rate on school enrollment~ 
reflecting the influence of the probability of obtaining employment 
alternative to schooling, is consistent with expectations, but the 
positive coefficient of the opportunity wage variable is contrary 
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to the direction of influence predicted and is a puzzle.
29 
c. Inputs to Child Quality-- School Expenditures 
The EXP equation represents the derived demand for one type 
of input used in child investment. The positive and significant 
effect of the wife's wage on school expenditures thus appears to 
reflect the strength of the substitution effect in the production 
of child quality-- increases in the price of time of women lead to 
the substitution of purchased goods for time, per unit of child 
quality produced, which more than offsets the weak negative relation 
between women's wages and the demand for the level of child quality. 
The insignificance of the female education coefficient may be due 
to the strong offsetting influence of the positive consumption 
effect of the wife's education, as evident in the child quality 
regressions. Increases in the schooling of women both strongly 
increase the demand for the level of child quality and, given the 
positive effect of education on the productivity of time in the 
home, induce substitution away from goods to more productive time 
in the production of each unit of child quality. The level and 
input substitution effects of female schooling, of opposite sign 
and, perhaps , of equal strength , thus may offset each other. 
That the coefficients of the male wage and schoolitgvariables 
in the EXP regression are not significantly different from zero, 
however, is further evidence of the small amount of time supplied 
by the husband to household child investment since the effects 
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of these variables on the level of child quality were also 
insignificant. Increases in schooling expenditures per pupil may 
thus be attributed to the substitution of wive's household child 
investment time for goods as women's wages have risen. 
Conclusion 
The principal general conclusions that can be made on the basis 
of the foregoing theoretical and empirical analysis are that the 
levels and movements in family size, male and female enrollment 
rates, and per-pupil school expenditures are the joint manifes-
tations of child investment decisions made within the family; 
that it is the set of parameters associated with the wife's time, 
principally her wage and education,which dominate these decisions, 
and that some differential investment in children with respect to 
sex occurs within the household. A continuation of the upward 
trends in the education and wage rates of women should result in 
further declines in fertility, continued increases in school enrollment 
rates, but at a faster pace for female than for male teen-agers, and a 
continued rise in educational expenditures because of the time-intensity 
of household child services production. 
These conclusions and the results on which they are based must 
remain tentative, however, because the male-female allocation of 
time between household production activities and the division of 
labor between home and market work may change in the future so that 
women may cease to be dominant in household child investment. 
In addition, the evidence of child investment differences between 
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male and female children requires further exploration, particularly 
as regards whether those differences can be attributed to tech­
nological factors in child quality production or are the result of 
the preferences of the parents, and if the latter, to what extent 
they are rational parental responses to sex differentials in the 
rates of return to child quality that derive from the economic 
structure of society. 
\ 
T,able I : Urban Teen Age School Enrollment Rates , 
Male and Females Aged 15-18 
%Change1960 1970 
Male •7586 .8436 11.0 
17.5Female .6979 .8023 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population 1960,PC (1)Sources: 
2D - 52D, Table 103 
Census of Population 1970, 








CEB Children ever born per 1000 maried women aged 35-44 
ENRM School enrollment rate of males aged 15-18 
ENRF School enrollment rate of female$aged 15-18 
EXP Total current public school expenditures per
pupil attending school in urban districts 
Independent Variables 
FW Weekly income of women aged 35-44 
MW Weekly income of males aged 35-44 
EDF Median years of schooling of women aged 35-44 
EDM Median year:of schooling of males aged 35-44 
EDLAW Minimum state lawful school - leaving age 
IM Infant mortality rate in urban areas, average
ann ml infant births per 1000 births for
1950-59 
N~NW Percent of urban population aged 35-44 non-white 
AGE Median age of non-agricultural employed males 
U Unemployment rate of urban population aged
15-24 
DPW Wage rate of non-agricultural unskilled workers,
average for 1950-59. 
C Constant term. 
Number of observations= 47; Rhode Island, Alaska, Hawaii excluded. 
Table III: Sources of Variables 
Children ever born: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population 1960, 
PC(l) 2D-52D; Table 113. 
Enrollment rates:_______ ; Tables 101 and 102. 
School expenditures: U.S. Office of Education, Biennial Survey·of Education 
in the United States, 1964-56, "Statistics of Local School Systems-­
Staff, Pupils, and Finances;" Chapter 3, Section IV; Table O for 
38 states; Chapter 3, Section III; Table 3 and 4 for 6 states 
having country-unit systems, groups I and II. 
Weekly wages: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population 1960, 
PC(l) 2D-52D; Median income, Table 134; Weeks worked computed 
from Table 118. 
Schoolin~: ______ ; Table 103. 
Compulsory schooling law: U.S. Office of Education, Circular Number 793, 
State Law on Compulsory Attendance. 
Infant mortality: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Vital Statistics, ''National 
Summaries," 1950-59. 
Proportion non-white: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population 
1960, PC(l) 2D-52D; Table 103. 
Age: ______ ; Table 187. 
Unemployment rate: _______; Table 176. 
Opportunity wage: U.S. Department of Labor, Statistical Yearbook, 1960. 
C 
Table IV: Regression Results 
\ 
Ct-values in parentheses) 
Dependent Variables 
CEB ENRM ENRF EXP 
Independent 
Variables 
FW -5.865 -.01092 -.00421 3.07015 
(1.66)* (3.07)* (2.149)Ji! ( 3.46) * 
MW 3.259 .00127 .00024 .22782 
(0.63) (0.14) (0.05) ( 0 .16) 
EDF -495.3 .30837 .23979 -19.7702 
(1. 84)* (1.28)* (1.34)~ (0.25) 
EDM 337. 8 * -.01299 .00022 21.9366 
(1.63) (0.05) (0. 00) (0. 37) 
EDLAW -3.613 .01399 -.002373 -2.70668 
(0.92) (1.33) * (0.47) (1.06) 
IM. -20.78 -.02204 -.01221 -1.4937 
(1.95)* (2.14)11t. (2.16). (0.58) 
NONW -14.94 -.00170 .00164 .138555 
(2.25)~ (0.30) (0.53) (0.10) 
AGE -84.52 * -.04134 -.01348 -1. 23294 
(3.64) (1.46)* (0. 86) (0.179) 
u .03529 .01406 
(1.65)~ (1.19) 
OPW .52233 .27810 
(1.69)* (1.64)* 
.9434 .08982 -.65804 
(4.74) (0.04) (0.58) 
R2 .5323 .6471 .6323 .6455 
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Footnotes 
1Malkiel and Malkiel ( 197 3) and Mincer and Polachek ( 197 3) are the 
most recent examples. 
2Becker (1960) was the first to consider the demand for the quantity 
and quality of children in the context of the family •. More recently, 
Willis (1973), Becker and Lewis (1973), and DeTray (1973) have developed 
models of child investment. In none of these studies is a distinction 
made between male and female quality. 
3DeTray is an exception. His empirical analysis, however, contains 
serious flaws. See note 27. 
4·
In real terms, current expenditures per pupil in average daily atten-
dance in public elementary and secondary schools rose from 525 dollars in 
1959-1960 to 889 dollars in 1969-1970. Source: Office of Education, U.S. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Digest of Educational Sta-
tistics 1972, Table 77. 
5 
For simplicity it will be assumed that O <f < 1. 
6
The linear homogeneity of the household production functions 
has been assumed. 
7Tb. • • • •is assumption is not unrealistic. In 1960, of the women 30-45 
years of age who were not currently in the labor force, over 85% had 
previous work experience. 
\ 
8see Willis (1973) for a detailed discussion of why efficient 
household production requires the equality of the value of the marginal 
product of the wife's time in the production of each household commodity 
with her market wage. 
9Michael (1973) prcvides evidence that the schooling of women is 
positively correlated with the efficiency of the contraceptive technique 
chosen. 
10see May and Heer (1968) and Ben-Porath and Welch (1972). 
11In the aggregate population, the larger families would be those 
with relatively more girls; large f families would thus dominate large 
(1-f) families, raising f above 1-f. 
12For a rigorous analysis of this point see Becker and Lewis (1973). 
13All references to the effects of changes in the shadow prices 
in the rest of the text will assume the constancy of the real income of the 
family; changes in the child investment variables in· response to shadow 
price variations will thus be "compensated" effects. 
14
The definition of parent's "time-value share", which will also be 
referred to as "earnings share" or "time-value intensity" is: 
t ..w. h • •
1J 1 , were 1 = W,H, J = S, CF, CM 
'IT • 
J 
15 oa bIn general, E = where a= one of the commodities,a,b ob a 
b = one of the household production parameters or prices. 
16While second-order conditions for the maximization of utility 
imply that increases in the nM or nF decrease the demand for male and 
female child services, and that both the quality and quantity 
elasticities cannot be positive, either E 
NF(M) 'TIF(M)' 
or E , , may be greater than zero. The model thus does not 
QF(M) TIF(M) 
predict how changes in the demand for child services are distributed 
between the quantity and quality of children. 
11see Smith (1972)~ 
1 ind home . ffec f ion18Th"is particu. ar k" of productivi"tye t o educat" 
is thus neutral between commodities but non-neutral between production 
inputs; the marginal productivities of the goods inputs are assumed to 
be unaffected by the wife's schooling. 
19Thus, if the time spent by the husband in the household production 
of child services is small, changes in his price of time would have 
only a negligible effect on the demand for child investment market goods. 
20 
rn particular, the analysis implies that family size would only 
have an independent influence on quality per child to the extent that par­
ents did not have significant control over fertility. When the family 
size variable was included in the child quality equations its coefficient 
did not attain significance. 
21
For example, while it is theoretically possible for the female wage 
coefficient to be positive in either the fertility or child quality regressions, 
a positive wage coefficient in both equations would represent a contradiction 
of one prediction of the model. 
22 The child investment behavior of farm families is significantiy 
different from that of urban families and urban income variables are not 
compatible with those pertaining to the farm population. Thus, the 
data used here are purged of the errors-in-variables and specification 
error due to these occupational effects. For evidence, see Rosenzweig (1974). 
23
For a detailed discussion of the advantages (and shortcomings) 
of using aggregate data to estimate fertility behavior, see Cain and 
Weininger (1973). 
24
see Willis (1973) for a detailed analysis of this point. 
25
The enrollment rates of these age groups were chosen because the 
interstate variation in the rates of the school-age population below the 
age of 15 was negligible. 
26See Ben-Porath (1967) 
27
DeTray tests the child quality implications of his model with a 
measure of quality per child that contains both school expenditures and en­
rollment. By combining inputs and output in one variable, he is led to 
the erroneous conclusion that child quality is not female time-intensive. 
However, the evidence obtained here (section e) for per-pupil expenditures 
and enrollment indicate that DeTray's result represents the net offsetting 
effects of the significant negative child quality and positive expenditure 
effects of the wife's price of time. 
28
see Mincer and Polachek (1973). 
29
0ne possible explanation is that these wages may be positively 
correlated with the returns to education. 
